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Libertad for All?
WHY THE HELMS-BURTON ACT IS AN EMPTY
PROMISE OF “FREEDOM” FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE
“Last time I was in Havana, a meal at a paladar would have
been rice and beans. Now, sushi. A certain sign of impending
apocalypse . . . . All Cuba seems waiting for something. For whatever
it is that happens next.”1
INTRODUCTION
On June 3, 1959, in the midst of the Cuban Revolution,2 the
insurgent Cuban government seized agricultural land belonging to
Daniel A. Gonzalez’s grandfather and expelled his family from the
property.3 The government’s seizures of agricultural land in Cuba
from private owners marked the beginning of Fidel Castro’s
revolutionary government, which ultimately overhauled the
Cuban property law system.4 Many owners of Cuban property, like
the Gonzalez family, never received compensation for their seized
property. Gonzalez maintains that the Cuban government
possesses his property to this day.5
1 Anthony Bourdain Parts Unknown, CNN TRANSCRIPTS, http://transcripts.cnn.
com/TRANSCRIPTS/1512/21/abpu.01.html [https://perma.cc/P9TZ-MPV3].
2 The Cuban Revolution was led by Fidel Castro against the dictatorial
government of Fulgencio Batista in 1959. The revolution is largely viewed as a reaction
to the rampant corruption present in Cuba’s politics and government, as well as to the
powerful external economic forces, led by the United States, that controlled Cuba’s
valuable primary export: sugar. The Cuban Revolution has been described as “the first
successful socialist rebellion in the Americas.” GEORGE LAMBIE, THE CUBAN REVOLUTION
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 120–22 (2010). To this day, the Cuban Constitution retains the
socialist structure and values implemented by the revolutionary 1959 Constitution.
CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA [CONSTITUTION], Apr. 10, 2019, Preámbulo (Cuba).
3 Complaint at 4–5, Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 1:19–cv–23988 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 26, 2019) [hereinafter Complaint]. Since the writing of this note, United States District
Judge Robert N. Scola Jr. granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Gonzalez’s amended
complaint for failure to sufficiently allege an ownership interest in the property in question.
Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 19-23988-Civ-Scola, 2020 WL 2323032, at *1–2 (S.D. Fla.
May 11, 2020). Gonzalez has accordingly appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, where a decision
is pending. Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 19-23988-Civ-Scola, (S.D. Fla. May 11, 2020),
appeal docketed, No. 20-12113 (11th Cir. June 9, 2020).
4 Daniel A. Espino, Note, Step-Down Restitution: A Proposal for an Equitable
Resolution to Confiscated Cuban Property, 32 NOVA L. REV. 423, 430 (2008).
5 See Complaint, supra note 3, at 1, 4–5.
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Seeking recompense for the theft of his family’s property,
Gonzalez filed a lawsuit in the fall of 2019 in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Florida. The suit was filed
pursuant to Title III of the Helms-Burton Act (Title III). Title III
creates a private right of action for individuals whose property
has been nationalized by the Cuban government to sue any
individual or entity who monetarily profits, or “traffics,” in
connection with any commercial activity that involves use of the
nationalized property.6 It was enacted as part of the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act (the Act), a
sweeping set of statutes that codifies the long-standing Cuban
embargo.7 The named defendant in Gonzalez’s suit, surprisingly,
was not the Cuban government, but rather Amazon.com, whose
trafficking activity consisted of marketing charcoal that was
produced from the Gonzalez family’s former property.8
Within the last year, dozens of other plaintiffs who share
similar revolution-era expropriation experiences have also filed
suits against corporations such as American Airlines, Expedia, and
Meliá Hotels.9 The Act allows the Executive Branch to suspend
Title III for six month increments, effectively giving it the status of
proposed legislation rather than enacted and operative law.10 After
Bill Clinton signed the Act into law in 1996, he suspended the
operation of Title III, citing the detrimental effect it would have on
U.S. foreign interests.11 Since that time, every presidential
administration has suspended the operation of Title III due to
similar concerns.12 This meant that individuals with potential Title
III claims were unable to sue in federal court during the period of
Title III’s suspension. Breaking with precedent, the Trump
administration lifted the twenty-four-year suspension on Title III,

6 See Helms-Burton Title III Comes to Life, AKERMAN (Apr. 17, 2019),
https://www.akerman.com/en/perspectives/helms-burton-title-iii-comes-to-life.html
[https://perma.cc/2VM4-5WPP].
7 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–91; Antonella Troia, Note, The Helms-Burton Controversy: An
Examination of Arguments that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act
of 1996 Violates U.S. Obligations Under NAFTA, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 603, 603 (1997).
8 See Complaint, supra note 3, at 6.
9 Dylan Jackson, American and LATAM Airlines Hit with Helms-Burton
Lawsuit, LAW.COM (Sept. 25, 2019, 8:38 AM), https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2
019/09/25/american-and-latam-airlines-hit-with-helms-burton-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/P
W9U-86G6] [hereinafter Jackson, American and LATAM Airlines]; Dylan Jackson, Meliá’s
Cuban Hotels Hit with Helms-Burton Class Action, LAW.COM (Sept. 11, 2019, 1:57 PM),
https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2019/09/11/melias-cuban-hotels-hit-withhelms-burton-class-action/ [https://perma.cc/94GZ-KAHP].
10 See 22 U.S.C. § 6085.
11 See Troia, supra note 7, at 604.
12 See Helms-Burton Title III Comes to Life, supra note 6.
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allowing for these lawsuits that name seemingly unexpected and
unconnected defendants to proceed in federal court.13
Title III aims to deter foreign investment that helps
propagate the undemocratic Cuban government.14 It is also
designed to compensate individuals whose property was
improperly nationalized by the Cuban government during the
Cuban Revolution.15 International law requires a State16 actor
that nationalizes property owned by a foreign national to
compensate that national for their lost property.17 The Cuban
government’s nationalization of foreign-owned property violates
international law because the Cuban government failed to
compensate most, if not all, of the former owners.18 In contrast,
the Cuban government’s nationalizations of its own citizens’
property—such as the Gonzalez family’s property—without
providing compensation do not violate international law.19
Individuals who are trafficking in the nationalized
property and are consequently open to liability under Title III do
not violate international law when they engage in trafficking
behavior. Thus, Title III enables plaintiffs to file frivolous
lawsuits against any defendant that is remotely profiting from
or is connected to a commercial venture involving property they
or their family owned nearly sixty years ago.20 Many scholars
have therefore argued that the justification for Title III is not
grounded in sound legal doctrine or policy.21
Title III of the Helms-Burton Act compromises the
separation of powers articulated by the U.S. Constitution,
violates international and domestic standards of legislative
13 Jennifer Hansler, First US Lawsuits Filed Over Use of ‘Confiscated’ Cuban
Property, CNN (May 3, 2019, 3:44 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/02/politics/helmsburton-lawsuits/index.html [https://perma.cc/E8FQ-QB26].
14 See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081(6)–(7), (11).
15 See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081(2)–(3).
16 The term “State,” as used throughout this discussion, connotes nations, as in
Nation-States or Sovereign States. A Sovereign State is defined as “[a] political community
whose members are bound together by the tie of common subjection to some central
authority, whose commands those members must obey.” Sovereign States, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
17 Jeannette M.E. Tramhel, Helms Burton Invites a Closer Look at CounterMeasures, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 317, 340 (1996–1997).
18 See id.
19 See id. at 341. The nationalization of its citizens’ property does not violate
international law because international law generally does not inquire into the acts of a
sovereign state when those actions are contained within the state. Id.
20 See 22 U.S.C. § 6081.
21 See, e.g., Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90
AM. J. INT’L L. 419, 425, 433–34 (1996); Tramhel, supra note 17, at 341–42; David O. Irving,
Note, ¿Viva Helms-Burton?: An Alternative to Continued U.S. Sanctions of Cuba and Threats
to Third-Party Nationals, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 631, 633–34 (2004). But see Brice M. Clagett,
Title III of the Helms-Burton Act is Consistent with International Law, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 434,
437 (1996) (“[T]itle III does no injustice to the ‘traffickers.’”).
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extraterritoriality, and will violate the due process rights of
defendants in these suits.22 It is ineffective in achieving the U.S.
policy objectives of returning democracy to Cuba through a
general embargo and compensating Americans who lost
property to the Cuban government’s nationalizations.23 While
federal courts should find Title III unconstitutional or at least
construe the statute narrowly to reduce the potential for
frivolous lawsuits, the most effective means for settling these
outstanding property claims is to negotiate with the Cuban
government in an arbitral tribunal modeled after the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal (Iran Claims Tribunal).24
Part I of this note will give a brief history of CubanAmerican relations and will provide an in-depth examination of the
mechanisms of Title III. Part II will examine the policy concerns
with Title III which render it ineffective in deterring foreign
investment into Cuba and compensating American property
owners for their losses stemming from Cuban nationalization of
their property. Part III discusses the constitutionality of Title III,
and ultimately concludes that it is unconstitutional because it
violates both the due process clause of the Constitution and the
doctrine of separation of powers. Part IV will consider the
international response to Title III, focusing on the response from
international legal institutions such as the European Union (EU)
and the United Nations (UN), and the various “claw-back” laws
that nations with important ties to both the Cuban and American
economies have enacted in response. Part V will propose a variety
of approaches courts may take to avoid enforcement of Title III, and
posits that the most effective manner in which to recompense
American property owners is for Cuba and the United States to set
up a claims tribunal modelled off of the Iran Claims Tribunal.

22 Helen Kim, The Errand Boy’s Revenge: Helms-Burton and the Supreme Court’s
Response to Congress’s Abrogation of the Act of State Doctrine, 48 EMORY L.J. 305, 307–08
(1999). The concept of extraterritoriality prohibits nations from legislating within the
territories of different states, with some exceptions. Luisette Gierbolini, Comment, The
Helms-Burton Act: Inconsistency with International Law and Irrationality at Their
Maximum, 6 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 289, 301–02 (1997).
23 22 U.S.C. § 6081.
24 See, e.g., Warren Christopher & Richard M. Mosk, The Iranian Hostage
Crisis and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal: Implications for International Dispute
Resolution and Diplomacy, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J., 165–68 (2007) (“[In 1980, after
extended negotiations aimed at ensuring the return of the Americans held hostage in the
American Embassy in Tehran and the discharge of frozen Iranian assets in the U.S.] [i]t
was agreed that all claims by Americans against Iran, by the Iranian government
against the United States, and by the two governments against each other would be
submitted to a Tribunal to be established in The Hague.”).
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THE MECHANISMS OF TITLE III AND ITS HISTORICAL
UNDERPINNINGS

By creating a private cause of action for plaintiffs to sue
individuals that economically benefit from their former
property, Title III seeks redress for property taken from
American citizens by the Cuban government during the Cuban
Revolution.25 Motivated by a tense geopolitical framework, Title
III’s mechanisms are aimed at addressing the complex legal
issue of foreign national property rights in countries that do not
share the same concepts or legal definitions of property.26
Ultimately, Title III adds fuel to the Cuban-American property
dispute by sweeping additional foreign political actors into this
controversy through its private cause of action, the purpose of
which is to deter foreign actors from investing in Cuba.27 These
investors are regulated by States that permit and derive
economic benefits from private investment into Cuba.28 Thus,
these States suffer harm when Title III deters their investors
from engaging in lawful foreign economic activity,29 further
igniting an international controversy that is unlikely to lead to
the resolution of legitimate violations of international law
stemming from Cuba’s nationalizations of American property.
During the Cuban Revolution, the Cuban government
undertook sweeping property reforms to bring about a
“fundamental change in ‘the ownership of [Cuban] land.’”30 The
postrevolutionary Cuban government passed land reform
statutes in which significant swaths of property owned by
foreigners and Cubans alike were nationalized, without
providing a means for owners to seek compensation from the
Id.
See Thomas Bauer et al., Cuba’s Legal Composite: A Blend of the Familiar and
the Foreign, 69 BENCH & B. MINN. 24, 28 (2012) (describing the Cuban property regime as
implemented by the postrevolutionary Cuban Constitution); Matias F. Travieso-Diaz,
Some Legal and Practical Issues in the Resolution of Cuban Nationals’ Expropriation
Claims Against Cuba, 16 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 217, 227–33 (1995).
27 See 22 U.S.C. § 6081; see also Lowenfeld, supra note 21, at 426 (“[T]he
principal purpose of the Helms-Burton Act is . . . to deter nationals of third countries from
doing business with and investing in Cuba.”).
28 See Cuba Attracts $1.7 Billion in Foreign Investment Despite U.S. Sanctions,
REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2019, 7:45 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-economy/cubaattracts-1-7-billion-in-foreign-investment-despite-u-s-sanctions-idUSKBN1XH02L
[https://perma.cc/H4DV-Z5W9] (remarking that Cuba continues to generate significant
levels of foreign investment in spite of stricter American trade sanctions owing to its
favorable foreign investment law).
29 See Jorge F. Pérez-López & Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, The Helms-Burton Law
and Its Antidotes: A Classic Standoff?, 7 SW. J.L. & TRADE AMERICAS 95, 107–10 (2000).
30 Joyce Rodriguez, Resolving Legal Claims Between the United States and Cuba:
Applying International Law Where Diplomacy Alone Falls Short, 14 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS.,
143, 161 (2018) (quoting Michael W. Gordon, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATION 75 (1976)).
25
26
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Cuban government. These reforms had a severe and negative
impact on American corporations that owned real property on
the island and intangible assets located in Cuba.31 At the time,
American commercial investment on the island totaled nearly $1
billion, and Americans owned approximately 40% of Cuba’s
sugar plantations.32 Unsurprisingly, the nationalizations
resulted in a massive outcry from American corporate entities
concerned about their investment interests, which compelled the
U.S. government to action.33 In 1962, President Kennedy
instituted the Cuban embargo partially in response to this
outcry.34 The Act codified into law and further strengthened the
executive orders that initially instituted the Cuban embargo.35
According to legislative findings, Title III responds to the
Cuban-American property dispute by deterring foreign investment
in these properties until Cuba provides compensation to the
American former owners,36 thereby allegedly protecting the
property interests of U.S. nationals whose property has been
nationalized by the Cuban government. Overall, the Act also aims
to return the Cuban people to “freedom and prosperity” and to
strengthen international sanctions against Cuba.37 After receiving
notice from the President that an adequate transition government
is in place in Cuba,38 Congress will determine whether the steps
Cuba has taken to compensate U.S. citizens for the nationalized
property are satisfactory, which is a precondition to lifting the
embargo.39 Adequate compensation for nationalized property
would fulfill Title III’s goal of protecting the property interests of

31 Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Redistributing Property: Natural Law, International
Norms, and the Property Reforms of the Cuban Revolution, 52 FLA. L. REV. 107, 109 (2000).
32 Wendy Dickieson, Comment, Artistic Absolution: Can Cuba and the United States
Cooperate in Restituting Castro’s Looted Art Collection?, 40 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 509, 513 (2019).
33 See PATRICK J. HANEY & WALT VANDERBUSH, THE CUBAN EMBARGO: THE
DOMESTIC POLITICS OF AN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 15 (2005); LARS SCHOULTZ, THAT
INFERNAL LITTLE CUBAN REPUBLIC: THE UNITED STATES AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 93–
100, 138–39, 200–02 (2009) (describing the various reforms Castro planned, the private
sector lobbying efforts that advocated for the Eisenhower Administration to take action
against the reforms, and the budding political campaign of John F. Kennedy to adopt a
hard-line stance on Cuban expropriations).
34 See SCHOULTZ, supra note 33, at 200.
35 See Kevin J. Fandl, Adios Embargo: The Case for Executive Termination of
the U.S. Embargo on Cuba, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 293, 320 (2017) (describing the Cuban
Embargo which terminated all trade and most diplomatic relationships between Cuba
and the United States); see also 22 U.S.C. §§ 6033, 6040.
36 22 U.S.C. §§ 6067, 6081.
37 22 U.S.C. § 6022.
38 See Lowenfeld, supra note 21, at 422 (“Section 204 authorizes the President to
take steps to suspend the embargo, but only upon submitting a determination to Congress
that a transition government, i.e., a government without Fidel Castro or his brother, is in
power in Cuba.”).
39 22 U.S.C. §§ 6065(b), 6067(d).
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U.S. nationals in Cuba, thereby nullifying the justifications for
Title III and, in turn, those that support the embargo.40
The introduction to Title III condemns the Castro
government’s nationalizations of American property because its
actions “undermine[d] the comity of nations,” and it urges the
Cuban government to recognize the property rights of nationals of
other countries.41 Title III, however, moves beyond the traditional
bounds of an embargo or economic sanction and brings the Act into
the sphere of impermissible extraterritorial legislation.42 It does so
by discouraging foreign investment in Cuba, although that foreign
investment may be perfectly legal according to the foreign nation’s
commercial and regulatory laws.43
The legislative history and purposes of Title III inform
how the private cause of action functions. Title III creates a
private right of action for a U.S. national to sue any “person”
that is knowingly “traffic[king]” in U.S. nationalized property for
either: (i) the value of the claimant’s certified Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission (FCSC) claim; (ii) the value of the claim
as determined by a special master, or; (iii) the fair market value
of the property.44 The Act defines a “person” as any person or
entity, including state entities.45 If a plaintiff provides proper
notice to a potential defendant that they are trafficking in
confiscated American property and that person does not cease
all trafficking activity, the plaintiff may collect treble damages,46
or a statutory enhancement of a damages award.47 Title III thus
allows plaintiffs to recover from the defendant three times the
amount of the actual damages they suffer.48
The FCSC is an independent, quasi-judicial body housed
under the Department of Justice.49 Prior to the passage of the Act,
many U.S. citizens filed claims with the FCSC for the value of their

See 22 U.S.C. § 6022.
22 U.S.C. §§ 6081(1)–(4).
42 See Gierbolini, supra note 22, at 320.
43 Title III Lawsuits for Cuba Expropriations Could Impact 21 Countries and 6 U.S.
States, U.S.–CUBA TRADE AND ECON. COUNCIL, INC. (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.cubatra
de.org/blog/2019/2/18/title-iii-lawuits-for-cuba-expropriations-could-impact-20-countries-and-6us-states [https://perma.cc/QW7Q-2T5W].
44 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1).
45 22 U.S.C. § 6023(11).
46 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (a)(3).
47 STEPHEN MICHAEL SHEPPARD, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW
DICTIONARY DESK EDITION, TREBLE DAMAGES (DOUBLE DAMAGES OR DOUBLE OR MULTIPLE
DAMAGES OR TREBLES) (2012), LexisNexis.
48 See 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(3).
49 About the Commission, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/aboutcommission [https://perma.cc/6TP7-6QDF].
40
41
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nationalized Cuban property.50 Despite attempts to negotiate, the
State Department failed to reach a settlement of these claims with
the Cuban government.51 Thus, regardless of the existence of a
potentially well-conceived system for adjudicating these claims
through negotiations with the Cuban government, Title III instead
imposes liability for the nationalized property for the amounts
determined by the FCSC on actors who were not involved in the
original property violations by allowing plaintiffs to sue these
actors for the value of these claims.
Title III defines a “trafficker” as someone who
knowingly and intentionally (i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses,
brokers, manages, or otherwise disposes of confiscated property, or
purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of, manages,
uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated
property, (ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise
benefiting from confiscated property, or (iii) causes, directs,
participates in, or profits from, trafficking (as described in clause (i)
or (ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as
described in clause (i) or (ii)) through another person, without the
authorization of any United States national who holds a claim to the
property.52

Notably, this definition of trafficking omits uses of
property that are incidental to and necessary for lawful travel to
Cuba.53 This broad definition of trafficking essentially
circumscribes all means of profiting from a nationalized property
because it encompasses any kind of commercial activity connected
to a nationalized property, no matter how remotely connected
that activity or the trafficker is to the property.54 In contrast, the
Fifth Amendment due process clause of the U.S. Constitution
prohibits courts from adjudicating disputes, such as Title III
property disputes, when they bear an insufficient connection to
the United States.55
50 Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Remedies in a Negotiated Settlement of the
U.S. Nationals’ Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 659, 662 (1996).
51 See Nick Miroff, In Major Breakthrough, Cuba and U.S. Discuss $1.9 Billion In
Property Claims, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_ameri
cas/in-major-breakthrough-cuba-and-us-discuss19billion-in-property-claims/2015/12/08/9bc2
ced0-9d23-11e5-9ad2-568d814bbf3b_story.html [https://perma.cc/3T6T-FYXZ].
52 22 U.S.C. §§ 6023(13)(A)(i–iii) (emphasis added).
53 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(B)(iii). An example of travel that is incident and
necessary to lawful travel to Cuba includes travel for family visits, educational trips,
professional research or meetings, humanitarian support for the Cuban people, journalistic
research and the “transmission of information.” Press Release, The White House Office of
the Press Sec’y, FACT SHEET: Charting a New Course on Cuba (Dec. 17, 2014).
54 Thomas J. Timmins et al., Cuba Update: Helms Burton Title III Activated,
MONDAQ (May 27, 2019), https://www.mondaq.com/International-Law/808600/Cuba-UpdateHelms-Burton-Title-III-Activated [https://perma.cc/ZGH2-8RXT].
55 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480
U.S. 102, 113–15 (1987).
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THE POLICY CONCERNS SURROUNDING TITLE III
LITIGATION

Due to the institutionalized settlement mechanism of the
FCSC Cuba Claims system, experts predicted an onslaught of
litigation after the Trump administration’s announcement,
especially since Title III, in its broad definition of trafficking,
permits suits based on almost any type of commercial activity.56
Nevertheless, this onslaught has not yet occurred because Title
III is cost prohibitive and underinclusive of claims and potential
claimants.57 If Title III does not generate a critical mass of
litigation, it will not serve its dual goals of deterring foreign
investment in Cuba and achieving a resolution for Americans
whose property was nationalized without compensation by Cuba.
A.

Title III’s Cost Prohibitive Nature Undermines Its
Purposes

One theory for the leisurely start to Title III litigation is that
the costs and complexities outweigh the potential payout to
claimants.58 If plaintiffs do not see a path to recovery on their claims,
Title III will not carry out its purposes—namely, to compensate and
deter. Title III suits are nearly guaranteed to be expensive litigation,
as there is a $6,548 special filing fee, as opposed to the general $400
filing fee for litigation in federal courts.59
The most likely Title III plaintiffs are domestic
corporations.60 Fifty of the largest certified claims are held by U.S.
corporations and account for nearly $1.5 billion of the total value of
the FCSC claims.61 U.S. corporations were subject to the most
sweeping revolutionary-era property confiscations because they
owned significant portions of Cuban land.62 Yet many corporations
56 John B. Bellinger, III et al., Calm Before the Storm? What We Can Learn from
the Slow Start to the Helms-Burton Cases, ARNOLD & PORTER (July 17, 2019),
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2019/07/what-we-can-learnfrom-helms-burton-cases [https://perma.cc/39EK-22VV].
57 See infra Sections II.A–B.
58 See Bellinger, III et al., supra note 56.
59 District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/
services-forms/fees/district-court-miscellaneous-fee-schedule [https://perma.cc/8DE2-FZYZ];
UNITED STATES DIST. COURT W. DIST. WASH., A PRO SE GUIDE TO FILING YOUR LAWSUIT IN
FEDERAL COURT 9 (2015). Title III provides no explanation for the increased filing fee, which
is set by the Judicial Conference of the United States. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(i).
60 See Bellinger, III et al., supra note 56.
61 RICHARD E. FEINBERG, BROOKINGS INST., RECONCILING U.S. PROPERTY CLAIMS
IN CUBA: TRANSFORMING TRAUMA INTO OPPORTUNITY 19 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu
/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Reconciling-US-Property-Claims-in-Cuba-Feinberg.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2UFE-9R3X].
62 See Bellinger, III et al., supra note 56.
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with certified claims are reluctant to sue alleged traffickers for fear
of discouraging and isolating their prospective or ongoing business
partners.63 Corporations are also fearful of sabotaging their efforts
to secure Cuban business licenses or harming other Cuban
investments by making use of Title III’s cause of action and
incurring the wrath of the Cuban government.64
For example, ExxonMobil, one of the first corporate
plaintiffs exercising its right to sue under Title III, filed its lawsuit
against only Cuban oil entities.65 It is likely that these Cuban oil
companies have foreign contacts that would, in turn, sweep further
alleged traffickers into ExxonMobil’s complaint under the broad
definition of trafficking.66 However, ExxonMobil chose not to name
other defendants.67 While it is possible that ExxonMobil may be
awaiting further discovery before naming other defendants,
sophisticated counsel employed by ExxonMobil is likely to have
knowledge of the Cuban entities’ main corporate partners and to
name them as defendants in the event that the Cuban corporations
are judgement proof. It is more likely that ExxonMobil is making
the conscious decision not to alienate other foreign corporate
defendants. Thus, the most probable corporate plaintiffs are
unwilling to sue foreign defendants via Title III, which contravenes
Title III’s agenda of discouraging foreign investment in Cuba in
order to chokehold the island’s economy and force its return to
democracy, just as the theory behind the Act postulates will
naturally occur in the face of economic devastation.68
Additionally, Title III excludes those who possess a certified
claim assigned to them by value, which further limits the efficacy
of Title III since corporate interests and claims frequently change

63 See Dylan Jackson, Where Are All the Helms-Burton Lawsuits?, LAW.COM
(June 7, 2019, 3:13 PM), https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2019/06/07/where-areall-the-helms-burton-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/HKL6-L426].
64 Peter Fox, Will Putting Title III of Helms-Burton into Effect Open the Litigation
Floodgates?, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (May 14, 2019), http://clsbluesky.law.
columbia.edu/2019/05/14/will-putting-title-iii-of-helms-burton-into-effect-open-the-litigationfloodgates/ [https://perma.cc/3GX4-K9DA].
65 Complaint at 1, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex S.A., No. 19-cv1277 (D. D.C. May 2, 2019) [hereinafter Exxon Mobil Complaint]; Mike LaSusa, Exxon
Sues Cuban Cos. Over $71.6M In Seized Assets, LAW 360 (May 2, 2019, 7:09 PM), https://
www.law360.com/articles/1155780/exxon-sues-cuban-cos-over-71-6m-in-seized-assets
[https://perma.cc/SB5Z-PUVD].
66 See Ernesto Hernandez Catá, Cuba’s Petroleum Trade Statistics and the
Impact of Cutbacks in Venezuelan Oil, ASS’N FOR STUDY CUBAN ECON. (Mar. 15, 2019),
https://www.ascecuba.org/cubas-petroleum-trade-statistics-impact-cutbacks-venezuelanoil/ [https://perma.cc/3KV9-77A8].
67 See Exxon Mobil Complaint, supra note 65.
68 See 22 U.S.C. § 6081(6); Fox, supra note 64.
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hands.69 An assignment by value occurs when an assignor transfers
a right to which they are entitled to an assignee by contract.70 For
example, the largest certified claim was filed by the Cuban Electric
Company, but is now held by Office Depot. However, these highvalue corporate claims are the ones that would have the strongest
deterrent influence since the more numerous smaller-value claims
are excluded from Title III.71 Thus, due to its costly nature and the
fact that the entities who can sue foreign defendants are wary of
doing so, Title III may prove to be largely ineffective in creating a
democratic Cuba by way of deterring the foreign investment that
promotes the communist regime.72
B.

Title III Intentionally and Procedurally Excludes Many
Plaintiffs with Property Claims Against the Cuban
Government

The Act purports to protect American property interests
abroad through Title III, yet its limits on who can sue contradicts
this stated purpose, rendering it an “irrational[ ] ,” impermissible,
and extraterritorial exercise of power.73 Title III imposes a
statutory amount in controversy of over $50,000, exclusive of
interest, costs, attorney’s fees, and the punitive treble damages.74
This amount may be calculated as either the damages amount as
certified by the FCSC, the fair market value of the property, or
the amount of the claim as designated by a court-appointed
special master.75 However, 79% of the FCSC claims are for less
than $10,000.76 This clearly indicates that many of the claims may
69 22 U.S.C. § 6082(4)(C); see also Chaim J. Fortang & Thomas Moers Mayer,
Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1,
2–3 (1990) (for the proposition that corporate interests and claims often shift ownership).
70 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
71 See FEINBERG, supra note 61, at 18, 20 (tracing the Office Depot corporate claim
and noting the exclusion of smaller-value claims from Title III litigation).
72 See 22 U.S.C. § 6081.
73 22 U.S.C. § 6022(6); see Gierbolini, supra note 22, at 289, 301.
74 22 U.S.C. § 6082(b). In order for a federal court to hear a particular case or
controversy, the plaintiff must claim damages that meet a certain numerical threshold as
determined by federal statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Normally, the amount in controversy
is $75,000 and applies only in suits where the parties are from different states, yet HelmsBurton Title III requires the plaintiff to allege damages of $50,000 no matter if the
defendant is from the same state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; 22 U.S.C. § 6082(b).
75 22 U.S.C. §§ 6082(a)(1)(A), 6083(a)(2). “[F]air market value” is the greater of
the fair market value of the property at the time of confiscation plus interest, or the current
fair market value of the property. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A)(i)(III).
76 PATRICK J. BORCHERS ET AL., CREIGHTON UNIV. SCH. OF LAW & DEP’T OF
POLITICAL SCI., REPORT ON THE RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING PROPERTY CLAIMS BETWEEN
CUBA & THE UNITED STATES 115 (2007) [hereinafter THE REPORT]; FOREIGN CLAIMS
SETTLEMENT COMM’N OF THE U.S., SECTION II COMPLETION OF THE CUBAN CLAIMS PROGRAM
UNDER TITLE V OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT OF 1949 69, 413 (1979)
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/fcsc/docs/final-report-cuba-1972.pdf [https://perma.
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not reach the statutory amount in controversy, which prohibits
these individuals from taking advantage of Title III’s cause of
action. The claims that do meet the statutory amount in
controversy may only just clear it, meaning that the damages that
these plaintiffs can receive may not be worth the significant
burden and costs of litigation.77 Thus, Title III’s statutory
requirement of $50,000 in controversy, along with other required
fees, prevent a significant portion of those with nationalized
property claims from suing under Title III, thereby compromising
the statute’s goals of deterrence and compensation. Only the
small number of claimants with high-value claims will be able to
take advantage of the private cause of action.
Title III also excludes residential property from its
definition of property unless it is a claim for residential property
that has been certified by the FCSC or it is property that is
“occupied by an official of the Cuban Government or the ruling
political party in Cuba.”78 However, of the smaller-value certified
claims that do not meet the statutory amount in controversy,
92.8% of the claims are individual claims for expropriated
property.79 Since a considerable majority of the FCSC certified
claims are less than $10,000, individuals likely filed more
frequently for less valuable residential and intangible property
such as securities, rather than for valuable commercial
property.80 Consequently, it is clear that Title III’s exclusion of
residential property claims prevents many potential plaintiffs
from suing under Title III, and that it largely fails to protect the
property interests of American nationals.
By barring claims for residential property that have not
been certified by the FCSC, Title III excludes an important
demographic from pursuing traffickers: ex-Cuban refugees who
lost their homes and later became naturalized American
citizens.81 One of the FCSC program prerequisites is the
requirement of “continuous ownership” of a claim.82 “Continuous
ownership” requires successive ownership of a confiscated
cc/5DCP-FR86] [hereinafter FCSC PROGRAM]; see also supra notes 50–51 and accompanying
text (discussing the FCSC claims system).
77 See Bellinger, III et al., supra note 56; see also THE REPORT, supra note 76,
at 112 (showing the average number and amounts of FCSC claims).
78 22 U.S.C. § 6023(12).
79 See THE REPORT, supra note 76, at 127; see also FCSC PROGRAM, supra note
76, at 412 (providing a helpful chart that breaks down the number of claims by value
between individuals and corporations).
80 See THE REPORT, supra note 76, at 121–28; FEINBERG, supra note 61.
81 See 22 U.S.C. § 6023(12).
82 See FEINBERG, supra note 61 (“To be eligible for compensation under FCSC rules,
a firm must be under continuous ownership by U.S. nationals (the ‘continuous nationality
principle’ of public international law).”); see also FCSC PROGRAM, supra note 76, at 72.
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property claim by a U.S. national from the time the property was
confiscated until the time the claim was filed.83 Admittedly,
many of the refugees’ property was nationalized after it was
deemed “abandoned” by the Cuban government, which would
disqualify the former owner from collecting compensation.84
Nevertheless, one legal scholar posits that these
“abandoned property” confiscations still qualify as takings, as
the law was “inconsistent with the constitutional norms in place
at the time of the takings and therefore invalid.”85 This is
because the properties were not taken for a legitimate public
purpose pursuant to the then-governing Cuban Constitution,
and because the theories of socialism espoused by the Cuban
Revolution only gave the government limited power to
nationalize property of personal consumption, such as
residences.86 As a result, nationalized Cuban refugees, who are
allegedly permitted to recover under Title III, are in reality
excluded from Title III’s statutory right of action based on the
property right that was taken from them by the Cuban
government.87 Title III’s limitations on the types of plaintiffs
that can sue in turn weaken the Act and render it ineffective.
For these reasons, Title III will not meaningfully end
foreign investment into Cuba. It imposes strict limitations on
the types of claims and claimants that may utilize the private
cause of action to recover damages, which serves to undermine
the stated purposes of the Act: to bring democracy to the island
through a general economic embargo and to protect American
property interests.88
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY TITLE III

In many circumstances, courts should not enforce Title
III of the Act because it will violate the due process rights of
defendants.89 The due process clause mandates courts to assess
See FEINBERG, supra note 61.
See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 26, at 235.
85 Id. at 235, 239–40.
86 Id. at 240.
87 See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6023(15), 6082. Note that this argument depends on the validity
of including Cuban nationals as claimants because international law does not prohibit a nation
from expropriating the property of its own citizens. See Gierbolini, supra note 22, at 311.
88 22 U.S.C. § 6081(6).
89 This argument depends on the applicability of the jurisdictional analysis that
the Supreme Court has developed with respect to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
This is because the Fifth Amendment constrains the powers of the federal government,
including Acts of Congress, such as the Helms-Burton Act. While the Supreme Court has not
ruled on this, courts and scholars have posited that the same jurisdictional analysis applies
to both Amendments. See Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(collecting cases); Republic of Pan. v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 942
83
84
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whether a defendant is subject to the court’s jurisdiction, i.e.,
whether a court may assert its power over the defendant; if not,
the court must dismiss the action.90 Because Title III defendants
and the allegations against them will often have only remote
connections to the United States, an exercise of jurisdiction over
many Title III defendants will not comport with the demands of
the due process clause. Even if a defendant is subject to the
jurisdiction of a U.S. court, Title III is unconstitutional because
it violates the separation of powers doctrine.91
A.

Title III Violates the Due Process Rights of Defendants

As a general matter, Congress is permitted to enact
extraterritorial legislation in violation of international legal
principles as long as legislators explicitly articulate their intent
when doing so.92 The Act clearly expresses such an intent, as it
abrogates the act of state doctrine, which is a “judge-made rule that
prevents [the U.S.] courts from sitting in judgement on official acts
of foreign sovereigns.”93 When enacting extraterritorial legislation,
Congress must adhere to the same constitutional limitations that
it is sworn to uphold when enacting domestic legislation,94 yet the
legislature violates this principle when it mandates unreasonable
assertions of jurisdiction over many foreign Title III defendants by
allowing plaintiffs to sue them for conduct that occurs abroad.95
While there is no Supreme Court precedent directly on point,
past decisions make clear that Title III violates the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment in two respects. First, an assertion
of jurisdiction over many Title III defendants will be unreasonable
under the due process clause. Second, many Title III defendants will

(11th Cir. 1997); see also Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and
Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1223 (1992).
90 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
91 See Kim, supra note 22, at 307–08.
92 Extraterritorial is defined as “[o]ccurring outside a particular state or country;
beyond the geographic limits of a particular jurisdiction.” Extraterritorial, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“[W]e look to see whether ‘language in the [relevant Act] gives
any indication of a congressional purpose to extend its coverage beyond places over which the
United States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative control.’”(alteration in
original) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949))).
93 Kenneth B. Sills, Act of State Doctrine, in 47 TEX. JURISPRUDENCE § 6 (3d
ed. 2020), Westlaw; 22 U.S.C. § 6082(6).
94 See Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 89, at 1239.
95 This due process argument is limited to foreign defendants because a finding
that a Title III defendant is a U.S. citizen may allow a federal court to retain general
jurisdiction over them, which in turn opens up the defendant to suit in U.S. courts for any
conduct. Since many U.S. persons, as defined by the Act, are prohibited from conducting
business in Cuba, it is more likely that defendants under Title III will be foreign defendants.

2020]

LIBERTAD FOR ALL?

245

lack sufficient contact with the United States, which is necessary to
subject them to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.96
The test for whether it is reasonable for a court to assert its
power over a defendant derives from Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court of Cal.97 and World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson.98
According to this precedent, courts consider four factors to
determine whether a plaintiff’s Title III lawsuit against a foreign
defendant complies with the due process requirements of “fair play
and substantial justice.”99 These are: (1) the burden on the foreign
defendant to litigate; (2) the forum state’s interest in litigating the
dispute; (3) the shared interest of the several states in furthering
fundamental social policies; and (4) the plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining relief.100 The sufficiency of contacts test mentioned
earlier is implicated in the first factor of this analysis.101
In respect to the first factor, the burden on a foreign
defendant in Title III litigation is substantial because they are
forced to litigate in a U.S. court over activity that occurs in Cuba
with little connection to the United States.102 These defendants
may or may not have direct control over the commercial activity
involving the property since Title III’s definition of trafficking is
broad enough to apply to downstream traffickers (i.e., an entity
such as Amazon.com whose limited connection with the property

96 See Congoleum Corp. v. DLW Aktiengesellschaft, 729 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir.
1984) (“It would not comport with fair play and substantial justice to assert jurisdiction
over a West German corporation in the distant forum of California on a claim that arises
out of activities in Europe, where the corporation had no contact with California other than
a developing sales market.”); Bret A. Sumner, Comment, Due Process and True Conflicts:
The Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Federal Legislation and the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 907, 947–55 (1997)
(proposing that it is unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over foreign defendants under Title
III and doing so will likely fail the minimum contacts test); Fox, supra note 64.
97 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113–15 (1987).
98 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); see also
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952) (“The amount and kind
of activities which must be carried on by the foreign corporation in the state of the forum
so as to make it reasonable and just to subject the corporation to the jurisdiction of that
state are to be determined in each case.”).
99 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
100 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292.
101 See Sumner, supra note 96, at 947–49 (standing for the proposition that only
three reasonableness factors are relevant in a Title III due process analysis and that the
reasonableness prong of due process does not weigh in favor of the defendant).
102 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 109–14 (failing a finding of minimum
contacts with the forum that justifies an exercise of jurisdiction under the due process
clause, the burden on the defendant to litigate has significant weight in a reasonableness
analysis); Congoleum Corp. v. DLW Aktiengesellschaft, 729 F.2d 1240, 1242–43 (9th Cir.
1984) (despite the presence of a large sales and marketing force in the forum state, the
lack of a connection between activity in the forum state and the harm suffered abroad is
insufficient as a contact for jurisdiction over a foreign defendant to be reasonable).
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at issue is marketing charcoal produced from that property).103 In
Asahi, the Supreme Court rejected such an attenuated link
between upstream product suppliers and the downstream
tortfeasor.104 The Court held that a Taiwanese manufacturer of tire
valves could not be liable for a defect in those valves that caused an
injury in California.105 The Court reasoned that the manufacturer
did not purposefully target California to sell its product, and there
was no “substantial connection” between the forum state and
defendant’s conduct.106 A substantial connection, the Supreme
Court held, consists of sufficient contacts with the forum that
demonstrate the defendant’s intention to “purposefully avail[ ]
itself” of the forum’s laws.107 The Court also stressed that, under
the circumstances, the burden placed on the defendant to travel to
a foreign state and defend itself in a foreign judicial system was
unreasonable and violated the due process clause.108
Similarly, a foreign defendant akin to Amazon.com, whose
trafficking activity consists of marketing or a similar activity,
does not have a substantial connection to the United States, the
proverbial forum state, because their commercial activity is not
purposefully directed at the former property owners.109
Consequently, in accordance with the due process clause, they
cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Title III
plaintiffs will argue that the connection to the United States is
the existence of their nationalized property claim in the United
States.110 This argument fails, because although the defendant’s
commercial trafficking activity does involve the use of former
American-owned property, that activity is not the cause of their
nationalized property claims and is not purposefully directed or
related in any meaningful way towards those claims.111 In other
words, there is no substantial connection between the plaintiff’s
claim and the defendant’s activities.
103 See Sumner, supra note 96, at 947, 952–53 (“A defendant that does not have
any contact with the United States cannot be sued under Title III for merely being involved
in, or tangentially related to, transactions in Cuba that are related to trafficking of
expropriated American property because contacts with former American property in
another country cannot be construed as voluntary contacts with the United States.”); see
also Complaint, supra note 3, at 4–6.
104 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 111–14.
105 Id. at 106–07, 114.
106 Id. at 112 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
107 Id. at 108–09 (citing Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475).
108 Id. at 113–14.
109 See Complaint, supra note 3, at 6.
110 See Sumner, supra note 96, at 949.
111 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 112–13; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (for the proposition that when there is no
affiliation or occurrence that takes place between the forum state and the underlying
controversy, jurisdiction is lacking).
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Plaintiffs will also posit that their interest and the
American interest in obtaining relief for these claims, the
respective fourth and second factors of the due process
reasonableness test, outweighs the burden on foreign
defendants.112 It is important to remember, though, that the
plaintiffs’ harm arose from actions taken by Cuba when it
nationalized their property without compensation. It is the State of
Cuba that is likely profiting from this nationalization since most
land in Cuba is state-owned.113 Thus, the foreign Title III
defendants are comparable to the attenuated upstream and
downstream suppliers in Asahi, and they should raise this
argument against jurisdiction at the outset of Title III litigation
against them.114
Not only did the Asahi Court find the burdens to the
litigant to weigh heavily against an exercise of jurisdiction, but
the Court cautioned that a jurisdictional analysis involving a
foreign defendant must take into account the interests of the
international community and their judicial systems.115 The
various countermeasures enacted by States in order to prevent
the application of Title III to their nationals, discussed in Part
IV, will almost certainly be taken into account as an interest of
the international community weighing against the exercise of
jurisdiction.116 This is a legislative manifestation of the will of
foreign States that demonstrates antagonism towards Title III.
Plaintiffs will likely counter that the United States has a
strong interest in protecting its citizens’ property rights abroad,
and that this outweighs the interests of the international
community. However, as noted above, the U.S. interest in the
protection of these property rights is against Cuba, which
perpetuated the violation of property rights, and not actors such as
Amazon.com who were not involved in nationalizing the property
and likely had no knowledge that their commercial activity
involved a claim to nationalized property when they began
marketing charcoal.117 Thus, a jurisdictional exercise of Title III
See Sumner, supra note 96, at 949.
See Dickieson, supra note 32, at 512.
114 See Sumner, supra note 96, at 954–55; see also Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Vigman,
764 F.2d 1309, 1315 (9th Cir. 1985) (“When a federal district court is sitting in
diversity . . . due process requires that the defendant have some ‘contacts, ties or relations’
with the forum state . . . . Where a federal statute . . . confers nationwide service of process,
‘the question becomes whether the party has sufficient contacts with the United States . . . .’”);
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
115 Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 115.
116 See Sumner, supra note 96, at 948–49.
117 See Defendant Amazon.com, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
and Memorandum of Law at 10–15, Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-23988RNS (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2019).
112
113
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will violate “traditional conception[s] of fair play and substantial
justice” for many foreign defendants.118
B.

Title III Violates Constitutionally Mandated Separation
of Powers

When a defendant is headquartered or conducts a significant
amount of business in the United States—such as Amazon.com or
American Airlines—the jurisdictional arguments discussed above
may not be applicable, as the defendant would have a substantial
connection to the United States.119 In such a situation, courts should
nevertheless find Title III unconstitutional and unenforceable
because it impermissibly restrains the judiciary’s role in the federal
government as envisioned in Article III of the Constitution, thereby
violating the constitutional separation of powers.120
Helen Kim argues that Title III’s abrogation of the act of
state doctrine restricts the judiciary’s ability to analyze the legal
merits of the dispute brought before it, thus violating the
constitutional separation of powers.121 The act of state doctrine is
a choice of law doctrine that prevents U.S. courts from inquiring
into the validity of a foreign sovereign’s acts when those acts take
place entirely within the foreign sovereign’s territory.122
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Supreme
Court invoked and applied the act of state doctrine to situations
where a sovereign nationalizes property within its boundaries,
even if the nationalization is a violation of international law. In
so doing, the Court articulated that the act of state doctrine rests
on “‘constitutional’ underpinnings.”123 Thus, the Supreme Court
declined to decide upon the validity of Cuba’s nationalization of
property.124

Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320.
See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985); Complaint, supra
note 3, at 2–3; Jackson, supra note 63. While neither Amazon.com nor American Airlines are
being sued in the forum in which they are incorporated, the Southern District of Florida,
where both corporations are being sued, may find jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant
to statutory authority or through a connection “between the forum and the underlying
controversy.” See Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780
(2017) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011));
see also Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 19-23988-Civ-Scola, 2020 WL 2323032, at *1–2
(S.D. Fla. May 11, 2020); Jackson, American and LATAM Airlines, supra note 9.
120 See Christopher M. Pisano, Unrealized Goals and Unintended Consequences:
Why the Helms-Burton and Iran–Libya Sanctions Laws are Counterproductive to the Interests
of the United States, 6 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 235, 252–55 (1998).
121 See Kim, supra note 22, at 308.
122 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 415–37 (1964).
123 See, e.g., Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423–24.
124 See id. at 400–03, 439.
118
119
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In response to Sabbatino, Congress passed the Second
Hickenlooper Amendment (the Amendment), which prohibits
U.S. courts from invoking the act of state doctrine when the
foreign sovereign’s nationalization of property violates
international law.125 Notably, the Amendment neither overrules
the Sabbatino court’s ruling that the act of state doctrine has a
constitutional basis, nor has the Supreme Court passed judgment
on its constitutionality.126 Since the passing of the Amendment,
the Supreme Court has narrowed the application of the act of
state doctrine by creating several exceptions to it, seemingly in
accordance with Congress’ wishes.127 None of these exceptions
have explicitly detracted from the fundamental notion that the
doctrine is based on the constitutional theory of separate but
equal branches of government.128
In contrast, pursuant to section 6 of Title III, courts are
prohibited from invoking the act of state doctrine to these
disputes; if courts find Cuba’s nationalizations to be valid under
the modern iteration of the act of state doctrine, former property
owners have no claim to the subject property and the private
cause of action fails.129 Yet, Title III’s complete abrogation of the
doctrine renders it unconstitutional because it removes the ability
of the judicial branch to evaluate the merits of cases and
controversies brought before it, as prescribed by the Constitution.
Put differently, because the act of state doctrine is based on the
constitutional mandate of the separation of powers, Congress
does not have the power to completely dispense with it. Congress
may only limit its application.130
The act of state doctrine is a result of the Court’s selfevaluation of its own foreign policy powers enumerated in Article
III of the Constitution. Article III defines the judiciary’s role in
the federal government and lists the requirements the federal
courts must follow when performing their role.131 By completely
125 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2); Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russ. Fed’n, 528
F.3d 934, 953 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
126 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2); see Kim, supra note 22, at 308.
127 See Kim, supra note 22, at 324–31, 336.
128 See Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij,
210 F.2d 375, 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (establishing the Bernstein exception); Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 690 (1976) (establishing an exception for when a
state acts as a commercial actor); First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de
Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 619–21 (1983) (establishing an exception for foreign sovereign immunity);
W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 406 (1990) (establishing an
exception when a foreign sovereign’s motivation is not grounded in an official state act).
129 See 22 U.S.C. § 6082(6).
130 See Kim, supra note 22, at 332–36.
131 U.S. CONST. art. III; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (“Article III, § 1, serves both to protect the ‘role of the
independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government,’ and to

250

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

abrogating the act of state doctrine’s applicability to Title III
lawsuits, rather than merely limiting its application, Congress
impermissibly alters the judiciary’s constitutional functions,132
and accordingly, Title III violates the separation of powers
mandate of the U.S. Constitution.133
IV.

INTERNATIONAL RECEPTION AND FOREIGN POLICY
RAMIFICATIONS OF TITLE III

Along with Title III’s arguable constitutionality and the
faulty legislative drafting that renders it unable achieve its
underlying policy goals, the international controversy it provokes
further renders it ineffective.134 The swift international response to
the lifted suspension of Title III includes prominent EU officials
who have vowed to challenge Title III and have decried its illegality
under international law.135 For twenty-eight consecutive years, The
UN General Assembly (UNGA) has passed a nearly unanimous
resolution calling for an end to the Cuban embargo.136 The
resolution condemns the Act for not conforming to international
law and the prevailing international principles of “nonintervention and non-interference in [the] internal affairs [of

safeguard litigants’ ‘right to have claims decided before judges who are free from
potential domination by other branches of government.’” (internal citations omitted)).
132 See Pisano, supra note 120, at 252–55 (noting also that the Act limits the
constitutionally-granted foreign policy discretion of the Executive branch).
133 Compare Kim, supra note 22, at 307–08 (“[W]hile Congress would be able to limit
or modify the non-constitutional, prudential aspects of the doctrine, it would be constitutionally
prohibited when that limitation infringed on the Court’s Article III powers.”), with Lowenfeld,
supra note 21, at 427–28 (“The authors of the Helms-Burton Act . . . . provided (in section 302
(a)(6)) that the act of state doctrine shall not be applicable to actions brought under the Act . . . . is
section 302 (a)(6) constitutional? I think so.”).
134 John E. Smith et al., Back to the Future: Helms-Burton Versus the Blocking
Statutes. Who Will Prevail?, MORRISON FOERSTER, https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/
190820-helms-burton-blocking-statutes.html [https://perma.cc/D2KK-ZHB6].
135 See Joint Statement from Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Eur.
Union for Foreign Affairs and Sec. Policy and Vice President of the Eur. Comm’n. & Cecilia
Malmström, Eur. Comm’r. for Trade, On the Decision of the United States to Further
Activate Title III of the Helms-Burton (Libertad) Act (Apr. 17, 2019).
136 The only two countries apart from the United States that voted against the
resolution are Israel—who consistently stands with the United States in opposing or abstaining
from the resolution—and, for the first time voting against the resolution, Brazil. Associated
Press, Israel Joins U.S., Brazil as Lone Backers of Cuban Embargo at UN, TIMES OF ISR. (Nov.
8, 2019, 1:03 AM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-joins-us-brazil-as-lone-backers-of-cubaembargo-at-un/#gs.fz670n [https://perma.cc/HDC4-CURB]; see Guest Blogger for Latin
America’s Moment, Brazil’s Vote on Cuban Embargo at the UN: An Unrequited Gamble for U.S.
Goodwill?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (May 20, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/blog/brazilsvote-cuban-embargo-un-unrequited-gamble-us-goodwill [https://perma.cc/VS7B-RS6A]. The
two abstainers were Colombia and Ukraine. Cuba: UN Members Overwhelmingly Support End
of U.S. Embargo, as Brazil Backs Washington, UN NEWS (Nov. 7, 2019), https://news.un.org/
en/story/2019/11/1050891 [https://perma.cc/GZ24-EBQA].
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States].”137 The most pervasive criticism of the Act from the
international community is Title III’s extraterritorial nature.138
These critiques weaken Title III’s proclaimed goal of promoting
democracy by deterring investment in Cuba.
Title III violates international law because it is an
extraterritorial piece of legislation.139 If a nation does implement
extraterritorial legislation, it must be reasonably justified in an
effort to regulate conduct that has a substantial, direct effect in
the forum nation.140 By permitting plaintiffs to sue defendants in
U.S. domestic courts for conduct that takes place entirely outside
of the nation, Title III violates this principle. It also cannot be said
that its extraterritorial nature is reasonably justified because the
alleged trafficking behavior does not have a substantial effect in
the United States and occurred approximately six decades ago.141
In response to what they view as impermissible
extraterritoriality, many nations, including important American
trade partners such as Canada and countries in the EU, have
implemented “claw-back,” or blocking statutes.142 In effect, these
statutes nullify the application of Title III to their respective
citizens through various legal mechanisms.143 Canada’s claw-back
statute, entitled the Canadian Foreign Extraterritorial Measures
Act, (FEMA), allows the Canadian Attorney General to order
Canadian nationals to ignore lawsuits filed against them
pursuant to Title III. The punishment for violating FEMA is
severe, giving Canadian nationals a strong incentive to avoid
complying and cooperating with attempts to collect on Americanrendered Title III judgments in Canada. The Act is also included
in the EU Blocking Statute, which compensates individuals for all
costs and legal fees related to a Title III lawsuit filed against
them.144 FEMA and the EU Blocking Statute further reduce Title
III’s efficacy and thus ensure that it will not achieve its purposes
of deterrence and compensation.
As a result of Title III’s extraterritoriality, U.S. federal
courts are left with the responsibility of carrying out
137 G.A. Res. 74/7, Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial and Financial
Embargo Imposed by the United States of America Against Cuba (Nov. 12, 2019).
138 See Pérez-López & Travieso-Diaz, supra note 29, at 114–27, 142–50.
139 Kathleen S. Adams, Casenote & Comment, Subchapter III of the Helms Burton
Act: A Reasonable Assertion of United States Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 21 HAMLINE L.
REV. 147, 159–60 (1997).
140 Id. at 165–66.
141 See Gierbolini, supra note 22, at 301–02.
142 See Pérez-López & Travieso-Diaz, supra note 29, at 95–96, 114–27.
143 See Muriel van den Berg, Comment, The Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act: Violations of International Law and the Response of Key American Trade
Partners, 21 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 279, 300–07 (1997).
144 See Smith et al., supra note 134.
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controversial foreign policy that violates international law by
reason of its extraterritoriality.145 This undermines the integrity
of the federal courts by compelling judges to make decisions
regarding foreign policy, for which they are generally illequipped.146 Further, extraterritorial measures such as Title III
are ineffective because they are in conflict with the international
community’s notions of jurisdiction. Nations that perceive Title
III as an invasion of their sovereignty will not respect its rule of
law and have taken steps to derogate its efficacy.147 This shifts
important foreign policy decisions from the legislative chamber
to the judicial chamber, where litigants will encounter judicial
reluctance to make foreign policy.148
V.

PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES

In order to truly realize the legitimate purpose of Title III,
namely to make reparations to Americans whose property in Cuba
was nationalized, the U.S. government must negotiate a settlement
of FCSC claims with Cuba in the form of a Claims Tribunal.149 By
allowing plaintiffs to recover punitive damages in the form of treble
damages from non-state corporate actors that are unconnected to
the initial nationalization by the Cuban government, Title III
lawsuits are not actually compensating former American property
owners, but rather endowing them with a windfall.150 Instead, the
Cuban government is the deserving defendant that should
compensate plaintiffs as a result of its failure to compensate
American nationals for the property it took from them.151
While a Claims Tribunal would be the most effective
method to compensating American nationals, this does not
immediately address the issues faced by defendants subject to
Title III lawsuits. In the meantime, courts should eschew
enforcement of Title III due to its unconstitutionality. Some
courts may be reluctant to do so due to the doctrine of
145 John Yoo, Federal Courts As Weapons of Foreign Policy: The Case of the
Helms-Burton Act, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 747, 762–63 (1997).
146 Id. at 764–75; see also Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333
U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (stating that the Constitution endows the Executive and Legislative
branches the authority to make decisions on foreign policy, and that the judicial branch “has
neither the aptitude, facilities nor responsibility” to review those decisions).
147 See William S. Dodge, The Helms-Burton Act and Transnational Legal
Process, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 713, 725–26 (1997); Note, Extraterritorial
Application of the Export Administration Act of 1979 Under International and American
Law, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1308, 1316 (1983).
148 See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 321–30
(1994); Yoo, supra note 145, at 769.
149 See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 30, at 157–58.
150 See 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(3) (permitting plaintiff to sue for treble damages).
151 See Tramhel, supra note 17, at 341–43.
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constitutional avoidance, which compels courts to interpret a
statute consistently with the Constitution if the statute at issue
is “susceptible of more than one construction.”152 These courts
should instead narrowly interpret the definitions of “property”
and “claim” in Title III in order to dismiss lawsuits that fail to
meet the requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP).153 Rule 8 mandates that a plaintiff’s complaint
must show that the plaintiff is legally entitled to relief.154 In this
way, courts may narrow the application of Title III to reasonable
cases, such as when a plaintiff shows a corporation actively played
a role in Cuba’s nationalization of a foreign-owned property.
A.

A Negotiated Settlement Will Satisfy Former Property
Owners for the Loss of Their Property Rights

As a way for these two nations to resolve this property
dispute, which is a precondition for ending the Cuban Embargo,
Congress ought to create a system for restitution of American
property claims based on existing international instrumentalities.155
The FCSC claims should be instructive in the amount of restitution
Cuba owes to the United States, but should not be strictly adhered
to as such a large payment has the potential to ruin Cuba’s
underdeveloped economy.156 Strict adherence to the FCSC claims

152 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842 (2018) (quoting Clark v. Martinez,
543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005)).
153 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); see also Havana Docks Corp. v. Norwegian Cruise Line
Holdings, Ltd., 431 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1378 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (dismissing a Title III lawsuit for
failure to state a claim when the plaintiff’s claim was not a property right within the meaning
of Title III). In April, 2020, Judge Beth Bloom of the Southern District of Florida granted the
plaintiff’s motion to reconsider after dismissing their complaint. The court reasoned that it
incorrectly dismissed the case because the plaintiff, rather than owning an interest in
property in Cuba, owns a claim to property for which the defendant may be liable, the
difference being that an ownership interest in property is unavailable to the plaintiff given
that their leasehold expired in 2004 and because Cuba’s nationalizations extinguished such
ownership interests. Havana Docks Corp. v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., 454 F.
Supp. 3d 1259, 1272–80 (S.D. Fla. 2020). However, the court’s decision is not supported by
the Act, which mandates that damages be determined as the greater of three different
calculations, one of which includes the current fair market value of the property. 22 U.S.C.
§ 6082(a)(1). Moreover, the court in Gonzalez took a narrow view of the meaning of “interest
in [ ] property,” indicating that reasonable minds may differ on the proper interpretation of
Title III. See Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 19-23988-Civ-Scola, 2020 WL 2323032, at
*1–2 (S.D. Fla. May 11, 2020). The court in Havana Docks again denied the defendant’s
motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s amended complaint on September 1, 2020, for reasons that
are not relevant to this argument. Havana Docks Corp. v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings,
Ltd., 19-cv-23591-BLOOM/Louis, 2020 WL 5217218, at *5–9 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2020).
154 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676–78 (2009); Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 554–56 (2007).
155 See 22 U.S.C. § 6022; Rodriguez, supra note 30, at 183–86; THE REPORT,
supra note 76, at 2.
156 See FEINBERG, supra note 61, at 28–29.
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would also unfairly preclude claims from formerly Cuban American
citizens, who were excluded from filing FCSC claims.157
This proposed tribunal should be modeled after of the
Iran Claims Tribunal.158 The Iran Claims Tribunal was formed
by agreement between Iran and the United States during the
Iran Hostage Crisis when the ensuing hostilities between the
two nations led to severe economic harm to the private interests
of nationals of both countries.159 It is largely lauded as a
successful dispute resolution mechanism.160 Relations between
the United States and Cuba are arguably not as fraught and do
not necessitate an immediate agreement such as the Iranian
Hostage Crisis required. Nevertheless, a Cuban-U.S. tribunal
would serve dual purposes. By negotiating the nature of the
tribunal, the two governments would be able to engage in
peripheral discussions surrounding the property dispute
without having to engage in direct talks on the dispute, which
would likely be fruitless due to the deep-seated disagreements
between the two countries.161 Second, an independent tribunal
will be less influenced by the tense history of Cuban-American
relations which will lead to fairer outcomes for both countries.
For example, The Iran Claims Tribunal’s method for
selecting tribunal members to adjudicate claims will satisfy
American and Cuban concerns surrounding the neutrality and
capability of the tribunal to fairly adjudicate their dispute.162 When
establishing the Iran Claims Tribunal, each state agreed to choose
three arbitrators from their own state to serve on the tribunal, and
these members in turn selected three neutral arbitrators from
157 See 22 U.S.C. § 1621. The “General Provisions” section of the subchapter of the
United States Code which creates the FCSC defines “person[s]” and “nationals of the
United States” as individuals, among other entities, who are U.S. citizens, meaning only
U.S. citizens could have filed under the Cuban Claims Program. Id.; see also Completed
Programs—Cuba, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/claims-against-cuba
[https://perma.cc/Z548-82US].
158 See THE REPORT, supra note 76, at 38–40 (recommending the partial use of
a tribunal to adjudicate the Cuban property dispute, but noting that a tribunal modeled
after the Iran Claims Tribunal would have shortcomings). The two-track solution
proposed by these scholars, however, is too complicated to implement given the current
state of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba. But see id. at 141–260
(describing the various items that the two nations need to negotiate in order for the
proposed solution to function properly, while noting that initial negotiations are likely
to break down due to a lack of trust between the U.S. and Cuba).
159 See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International
Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2005).
160 Id.
161 See William M. Leogrande, Opinion, What Trump Misses About Cuba, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/01/opinion/what-trump-missesabout-cuba.html?searchResultPosition=3 [https://perma.cc/6VNB-3VWD].
162 David D. Caron, The Nature of the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal and the
Evolving Structure of International Dispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 104, 129 (1990).
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other states. By selecting members of the arbitral tribunal in this
way, both Cuba and the United States can ensure that their
interests will be represented and that the neutral arbitrators will
serve as tiebreakers in the event of an impasse.163
The Iran Claims Tribunal’s system for satisfying awards
also serves as a precedent for the Cuban Tribunal’s framework.
The United States placed frozen Iranian assets in a secured
account in order to ensure the availability of funds to satisfy the
Iran Claims Tribunal’s awards.164 The United States can
similarly ensure that restitution will be made to its nationals by
compelling Cuba to place a specified amount of money in a
secure bank account. The value of the money to be placed in the
bank account should be ascertained by referring to the FCSC
total value of claims. This value can then be adjusted downwards
based on Cuban counterclaims against America and Cuba’s
ability to pay.165 Cuba can partially raise the money by either
instituting a small fee on alleged Title III traffickers for using
the disputed property, or on all foreign investors. Doing so will
have the effect of deterring foreign investment as Title III seeks
to do, yet the incentive for Cuba to impose such a fee is strong
since it is connected to their ability to escape from the
devastating embargo.166 And, in order to fund the Tribunal, a
small administrative fee may be taken out of each award the
Tribunal renders, as the Iran Claims Tribunal did.167
Using a tribunal to achieve the purposes of Title III is a
superior alternative to Title III’s private cause of action.168 First, a
tribunal will hold Cuba accountable to American claimants instead
of punishing innocent third parties as Title III does.169 Second,
Cuba’s imposition of a fee on the commercial activity of alleged Title
III traffickers for the purpose of raising money for the tribunal’s
distribution fund will deter foreign investment as Title III seeks to
do.170 Third, an arbitral tribunal can vindicate American property
rights more efficiently and comprehensively than traditional private
See Posner & Yoo, supra note 159, at 34.
See Caron, supra note 162.
165 See FEINBERG, supra note 61, at 19; Rodriguez, supra note 30, at 196–97.
166 See 22 U.S.C. § 6067(d) (“It is the sense of the Congress that the satisfactory
resolution of property claims by a Cuban Government recognized by the United States
remains an essential condition for the full resumption of economic and diplomatic relations
between the United States and Cuba.”); see also Reuters Staff, U.S. Trade Embargo Has
Cost Cuba $130 Billion, U.N. Says, REUTERS (May 8, 2019, 8:10 PM), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-cuba-economy-un/us-trade-embargo-has-cost-cuba-130-billion-unsays-idUSKBN1IA00T [https://perma.cc/84MA-YR83].
167 U.S. v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62–64 (1989).
168 22 U.S.C. § 6082.
169 See Tramhel, supra note 17, at 341–43.
170 22 U.S.C. § 6081.
163
164
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litigation can.171 By using pre-existing FCSC claims data as a
framework for rendering awards, the tribunal will spend less time
calculating damages than a court would.172 Title III plaintiffs will
receive damages in an amount they deserve for the loss of their
property rights in Cuba, rather than receiving a windfall through
Title III’s treble damages allowance. Thus, Title III’s objectives will
be met by a tribunal in a way that does not violate the Constitution
or international law in the way Title III does.173
B.

Short Term Solutions to Limit the Application of Title
III

Although the establishment of a Claims Tribunal is the
most effective and fair means of achieving the purposes of Title III,
it is necessarily a long-term solution. Cuba and the United States
must first work on a detailed agreement to instate a claims
tribunal. If past experience is an indicator, this would likely take
many months, just as it took America and Iran nearly two years to
agree on the Iran Claims Tribunal in the midst of a hostage
crisis.174 The short-term solutions to Title III that U.S. courts
should implement include: (1) dismissing lawsuits for failure to
comport with the due process requirement of personal jurisdiction;
(2) declaring the law unconstitutional; and (3) interpreting Title
III’s statutory language narrowly in order to avoid the potential for
unlimited liability under Title III’s private cause of action.175
As discussed in Section III.A, Title III will violate the due
process rights of many defendants.176 When a defendant is not
subject to the jurisdiction of the court they are being sued in, a
court must dismiss the action.177 If a defendant fails to raise this
defense, a court cannot dismiss an action for lack of jurisdiction
on its own because the defendant impliedly consents to that
court’s jurisdiction by arguing on the merits of the case.178
Because this solution is case-specific, it is only effective when
171 See Thomas H. Oehmke, Arbitrating International Claims—At Home and
Abroad, 81 AM. JURIS. § 10 (2020), Westlaw.
172 See Completed Programs—Cuba, supra note 157.
173 See supra Parts III and IV.
174 See Oehmke, supra note 171, §§ 123–24; see also Ron Soodalter, 444 Days in Hell,
HISTORYNET, https://www.historynet.com/444-days-hell.htm [https://perma.cc/4U75-EXRC].
175 Havana Docks Corp. v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., 431 F. Supp.
3d 1375, 1377 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (reconsideration granted, order vacated by Havana Docks
Corp. v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 3d 1259, 1268–80 (S.D. Fla.
2020); see also supra Parts II and III (respectively discussing the policy concerns Title III
raises and its unconstitutionality).
176 See supra Section III.A.
177 Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283–85 (2014).
178 Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703–05 (1982).
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there are legitimate issues of jurisdiction over the defendant and
will not always function to avoid enforcement of Title III’s
private cause of action. When this solution does apply though, it
will almost certainly lead to the non-enforcement of Title III.
A more encompassing approach that courts should take
when faced with adjudicating Title III lawsuits is to analyze the
constitutionality of the statute itself. Since Title III violates the
constitutional separation of powers, courts that are confronted with
examining the issue should declare the law unconstitutional and
strike it down.179 This solution is applicable to every Title III
lawsuit, as opposed to a limited number as in the jurisdictional
solution, because every Act of Congress must comply with the
Constitution.180 Because Title III does not comply with the
Constitution, its private cause of action should be struck down.
A court may instead uphold Title III by interpreting it
within the bounds of the Constitution, pursuant to the doctrine
of constitutional avoidance.181 Since it is the abrogation of the
judicially-created act of state doctrine that makes Title III
unconstitutional, courts would simply employ the act of state
doctrine when adjudicating Title III lawsuits in order to
interpret Title III consistently with the Constitution.
This alone does not resolve the fact that Title III is an
international legal quagmire.182 The Second Hickenlooper
Amendment abrogates the act of state doctrine when there is a
clear violation of international law.183 Cuba has violated
international law by failing to compensate foreign property owners
for the nationalizations of their property.184 Thus, some courts will
undoubtedly conclude that the act of state doctrine is inapplicable
to Title III litigation and will continue to hold foreign third parties
liable for conduct that does not occur in the United States and is
not illegal in their own countries.
Since the constitutional solution is riddled with openended possibilities, an effective secondary solution to the
application of Title III is for courts to narrowly construe the
statutory language, which would in turn limit the opportunity for
See supra Section III.B.
See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 533–38 (2012) (“The
Federal Government ‘is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers’ . . . . Congress
may, for example, ‘coin Money,’ ‘establish Post Offices,’ and ‘raise and support Armies.’ The
enumeration of powers is also a limitation of powers, because ‘[t]he enumeration presupposes
something not enumerated.’ The Constitution’s express conferral of some powers makes clear
that it does not grant others.” (internal citations omitted)).
181 See, e.g., Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842 (2018).
182 See supra Part IV.
183 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2).
184 See Tramhel, supra note 17.
179
180
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plaintiffs to receive an award of damages from an undeserving
defendant. This solution is analogous to a federal judge’s
reasoning in the recent dismissal of one of the first Title III
cases.185 For example, nowhere in the Act or its legislative history
is the term “claim” defined.186 A court can construe the term
narrowly so that it conforms with basic and fundamental concepts
of property law, where a property owner is only entitled to
damages stemming from nationalizations that equate to the value
of their property interest.187 To illustrate, a court can define claim
to mean any claim to property that was not expropriated by the
Cuban government pursuant to any postrevolutionary legislation,
as detailed in Part I.188 By doing so, courts can avoid enforcing
Title III by dismissing suits for failure to state a claim pursuant
to Rule 8 of the FRCP.189 This will also serve as a prompt to the
legislative and executive branches that the judicial branch should
not be used to manage disputes involving foreign policy. Thus, by
reading Title III narrowly and consistently with preexisting
property law, courts can limit the application of Title III and avoid
an unreasonable extraterritorial exercise of the law.
CONCLUSION
Title III does not address the injustices that stemmed from
Cuba’s nationalization of private property and those aggrieved are
in need of recourse. Cuba nationalized significantly valuable
American assets without providing any semblance of recompense,
in violation of international law.190 A punitive measure such as
Title III is not the way to address this international dispute. Title
III is unconstitutional, extraterritorial, and has caused
international controversy.191 It will not achieve its main purpose of

185 See Havana Docks Corp. v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., 431 F. Supp.
3d 1375, 1378–79 (S.D. Fla. 2020). A federal judge recently dismissed a Title III lawsuit filed
against Norwegian Cruise Lines based on a narrow reading of Title III’s definition of “a claim
to property.” As noted earlier, this opinion has been vacated by the same district court. See
supra note 153 and accompanying text. The opinion cited here notes that the plaintiff owns a
claim to property through the FCSC, which Title III presumes to be a valid claim to property.
Regardless, the opinion reasons, the nature of the plaintiff’s property rights to the disputed
property expired in 2004. Consequently, although the plaintiff owns a claim to nationalized
property that is currently being “trafficked” within the definition of Title III, the plaintiff is
precluded from seeking damages for trafficking activity that occurs after their property rights
to the nationalized property expired. Havana Docks Corp., 431 F. Supp. 3d at 1378–80.
186 See 22 U.S.C. § 6023.
187 See Havana Docks Corp., 431 F. Supp. 3d at 1380.
188 See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
189 See Havana Docks Corp., 431 F. Supp. 3d at 1381.
190 See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
191 See supra Parts III and IV.
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recompensing former property owners.192 An effective solution is for
courts to declare the law unconstitutional, but given the nuances
of constitutional interpretation, this may not end enforcement of
Title III.193 It also does not resolve the outstanding issue of
compensating former property owners. The same holds true for an
approach whereby defendants challenge Title III based on
violations of their due process rights.194 A narrow interpretation of
the statute may work to limit the application of Title III, yet it
would not resolve the issues Title III raises in the international
legal context.195 The superior, and arguably only, way to end this
dispute is to hold Cuba accountable for its actions through an
arbitration process. This would have the effect of thawing CubanAmerican relations and would lead to a final resolution of this
property dispute. Only then will Congress consider lifting the
oppressive Cuban Embargo, which has soured Cuban-American
relations for the better part of the last century.196 Perhaps when the
embargo is lifted, lawmakers in the proverbial “smoke-filled room”
can finally enjoy that room with a Cuban cigar.
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